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10 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 10 February 1969

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DD/I reported that, per a recent conversation with [redacted] [redacted] the Random House publishing schedule through July does not include the publication of the Ramparts book, The CIA File. Random House does have first refusal rights on the publication from McGraw-Hill. He noted that the Robert Welch material on CIA is now extremely dated.

DD/I noted that briefing formats for Thursday's NSC meeting are extremely confused. Current plans call for a fifteen- or twenty-minute briefing by the Director on Soviet strategic posture, to be followed by J-5 on U. S. military posture and a briefing by Ivan Selin on a strategic options paper. DD/I noted that U. S. options on the Nigeria/Biafra problem are also on the tentative agenda and called the Director's attention to a recently completed OCI background memorandum on this problem.

Godfrey reported that Le Duc Tho has returned to Hanoi.

[redacted]

D/ONE noted that the Biafra paper, "How the War Might End," prepared by OCI/OER has received limited distribution within State and the White House staff. In response to the Director's query, D/ONE noted that copies were furnished by the BNE Secretary.

D/ONE reported that NIE 11-11-69, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, and SNIE 93-69, Brazil, are scheduled for

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
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consideration on Thursday but that State is not yet prepared to meet on the Brazil SNIE. He noted that SNIE 20-69, Security Conditions in Western Europe During President Nixon's Visit, is ready for telephonic coordination.

D/ONE led a discussion on the difficulties encountered in preparing a SNIE on the prospects for a Middle East settlement and/or the consequences of no settlement. D/ONE noted that the deadline for the completion of the paper is 27 February, and the Director asked that sufficient time be taken to give this important matter all the attention it demands.



DD/S related that Mrs. Dulles will be going to Switzerland. The Executive Director observed that she is probably spending some time in Long Island prior to the European trip, and the Director asked that he be kept informed of her plans.

Carver reported that the Vietnamese paper (responses to the twenty-eight questions) has now been completed, and he sought and received the Director's concurrence in sending one copy to General Wheeler and two copies to General Carroll.

Carver reported that preparations for briefing Secretary Laird on Laos and the Soviet role there are complete. The Director noted that he will be unable to attend but will send Secretary Laird a note to be handcarried by Carver.

Maury raised the 20 February briefing of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and reported that according to George Murphy, the Committee would like to allow plenty of time for questions. The Director reviewed the several topics to be covered in the briefing, and the DD/S&T commented that the briefing paper is near completion.

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Maury noted advice received from Kenneth BeLieu, a Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, that the Agency would be well advised to have a lobbyist capable of representing our interests with respect to the Ervin bill. Maury noted that Senator Bayh has expressed his willingness to be helpful and that perhaps Senator Jackson could be recruited.

Maury reported that he has been invited to attend the weekly White House staff interdepartmental meetings of legislative liaison officers. The Director encouraged him to attend when items of known interest to the Agency are pending.

Maury briefed on his recent good conversations with Congressman Lipscomb, and the Director urged that he maintain liaison with the Congressman.

Maury called attention to Secretary Laird's interview yesterday on the CBS program "Face the Nation." He noted the probable areas of conflict between Secretary Laird's figures on the magnitude of the Soviet ABM effort as compared with DD/I data. Laird apparently pictured the Soviet effort as from four to seven times greater than the U. S. effort in terms of GNP.

Houston briefed on recent conversations with Secretary Rogers and James Donovan. He noted that U. Alexis Johnson had stimulated the idea of possible discussions with Castro and that Donovan has advised that such conversations not be confined simply to remedies for the hijacking problem. The Director noted that, since this problem is now being considered at an appropriate level, Houston should take advantage of this channel to pass along any constructive Agency ideas on Cuban/U. S. relations.

Parrott called attention to a recent draft Executive Order constituting PFIB in lieu of PFIAB and noted that the Executive Order envisions the establishment of an Executive Director with staff. A discussion ensued seeking to differentiate between the responsibilities of an Executive Director as opposed to the Executive Secretary to PFIAB. The Director indicated that he will seek to clarify the differences and the projected responsibilities of [REDACTED]

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DD/P noted that [] provided Senator Symington with an excellent briefing, and the Director sought assurances that arrangements have been made to provide similar careful treatment of the Senator throughout the remainder of his trip.

Executive Director reported that [] has been designated to chair the real-time readout task force. 25X1

Executive Director noted that the Brookings briefing had gone well and called attention to the projected briefing of the student editors on Friday.

The Director asked the DD/P to meet with him on tomorrow's 303 Committee agenda.

The Director noted that it will be some weeks before a DDCI is named. He related that he has asked John Bross to handle all community matters and asked that others take their appropriate share of initiative and that no important correspondence be held up for his signature simply because he is briefing in Texas or otherwise unavailable.

The Director again mentioned his hope that he can schedule an early meeting with all concerned on how to service NSC requirements.

The Director called attention to the article by John Finney in the Sunday New York Times relating the role of William Miller, a legislative aide to Senator Cooper, in raising questions on the efficacy of the Sentinel program.

*The Director asked that George Carver provide data on equivalent troop strengths when we mention Communist battalion, division, etc., strength in Vietnam. He also asked for clarification of procedures and figures used in describing the results of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).

The Director reported that his one-hour briefing of former President Johnson went well and complimented Godfrey on the preparation of the material. He noted that flights to Texas and turn-around time for Jet Star aircraft should be carefully calculated in the future.


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The Director called attention to the article in the Sunday New York Times Magazine by Amnon Rubinstein, a Tel Aviv newspaperman, and encouraged all those following Israeli developments to read it.

Goodwin reported a telephone call from Peter Youngusband of the London Daily News seeking clarification on a report that the FBI and CIA send personnel to Scotland Yard for small arms training.



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
L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

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Hall of Sentinel Is Traced To a 10-Month-Old Memo



The New York Times

Feb. 9, 1969

Dots denote Sentinel sites planned in U.S., each in an oval-shaped defense area. Hawaii also would get a site.

Note to Senator Cooper by Aide Raised Doubts, and Battle Began

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8—One of the most ambitious defense projects ever conceived by the Pentagon was temporarily halted this week because of a memorandum that was handed to Senator John Sherman Cooper 10 months ago.

Last April 18, when the Senate was debating a bill authorizing weapons procurement by the Defense Department, William G. Miller, a 37-year-old former Foreign Service officer, who is now a legislative aide to Senator Cooper, walked down a side aisle and handed a one-page memorandum to the Senator.

The memorandum suggested that the request for money to start deploying the Sentinel missile defense system "deserves questioning" because the system had not been "fully proven by research."

The Kentucky Republican harumphed, as is his manner

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HALT OF SENTINEL TRACED TO MEMO

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

when he thinks an affirmative point has been made. The harumph was never heard in the Pentagon, but it was the beginning of protracted battle.

The fight started slowly and uncertainly, but it eventually put the entire military establishment so much on the defensive that it decided it had better regroup before proceeding with deployment of the Sentinel system.

It was a battle in which a Kentucky mountain lawyer educated himself in the technical intricacies of nuclear warfare, scientists and intelligence experts worked behind the scenes with Senators and a determined, well organized minority dared take on the military establishment in the Senate and finally prevailed, at least in the first round of the battle over the Sentinel system.

When Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird announced this week a temporary halt in placing the system, one of the principal reasons was that it was becoming increasingly unlikely that the Senate would approve further deployment money.

If the Pentagon's purpose in ordering the delay and review of the system was to disarm Congressional opposition, it appears likely to fail in that political objective.

An important new political factor has been injected into the controversy, namely the opposition building up in metropolitan areas to the establishment of Sentinel bases in their suburban backyards.

In Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu, objections are being raised by city councils, church groups, conservationists, union leaders, real estate developers, peace groups and scientists to emplacement of nuclear-tipped missiles in their cities or suburbs.

Opposition Mounting

As this political backlash is felt on Capitol Hill, the Congressional opposition to the system shows signs of mounting.

Indicative were the comments this week of the Senate Republican leader, Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, who until now has been a stalwart defender of the Sentinel system, but who has been feeling some of the constituent protests against building a Sentinel base in suburban Libertyville, 26 miles northwest of Chicago's Loop.

Seated on a table in the Senate press gallery, the Republican leader conceded that perhaps "the time has come to take a cooler and more deliberate look at this proposal."

If Senator Dirksen, one of the more sensitive political barometers on the hill, was wavering, it was a sure sign that he sensed a majority sentiment was building up in the Senate against deployment of the Sentinel.

apathetic thus far in the controversy, the political backlash also was making its mark.

L. Mendell Rivers of South Carolina, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was "feeling the political heat," as one colleague put it, when he sent a letter last Tuesday to the Pentagon urging a halt on deployment until the Administration clarified its position on the system.

Holifield Reservations

Probably more significant than the Rivers letter, however, were the reservations building up in the mind of Representative Chet Holifield of California, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which with its warnings of Chinese nuclear developments was instrumental in pushing the Johnson Administration into ordering deployment of the Sentinel system.

The Army is proposing to establish a Sentinel base at Cheli Air Force Base in the southeastern section of Los Angeles County, only a half mile from Mr. Holifield's home in Montebello.

This has brought protests from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, which wants to use the World War II base for industrial and housing development, and suggestions from Mr. Holifield that the Army should not build its Sentinel bases in populated areas.

The California Democrat's reservations, however, go much deeper than the deployment of the Sentinel bases. With his Atomic Energy Committee, he intends to explore the question of whether it is feasible to build a missile defense to protect populations and whether it might not be more advisable to use the Sentinel system just to protect Minuteman missile bases.

Balance in the House

If Mr. Holifield, one of the respected liberal leaders in the House, comes to that public conclusion after his committee's hearings, it should be enough to tip the balance in the House against deployment of the system.

Should Congress eventually block the plan, it is commonly acknowledged in the Senate that much of the credit must go to Senator Cooper and the battle he began 10 months ago.

Others had taken up the battle before him only to fail. Senator Albert Gore, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, had latched onto the issue and then let it go.

Former Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania, who had sought to eliminate Sentinel

funds, drove away support by his didactic liberalism.

When Senator Cooper took up the issue he had the personal advantage of commanding considerable respect among his colleagues. While he mumbles to the point that his words are often inaudible to his colleagues, at least they listen to him when he rises to speak.

After receiving the Miller memorandum, Senator Cooper stood up with what he later conceded was a hastily and ill-conceived amendment proposing that the Sentinel not be deployed until the Secretary of Defense had certified that the system was practicable and its cost accurately established. The amendment was defeated by a 31-to-28 vote.

Supporters Recruited

The surprising closeness of the vote encouraged Senator Cooper to carry on the battle. He began a process of self-education and recruitment of supporters.

One of his first recruits was Senator Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan, who brought to the battle the personal asset of being liked by liberals and conservatives alike.

Along with Senator Hart, Senator Cooper began the process of self-education. In meetings in their offices and over the dinner tables, they heard from Central Intelligence Agency officials and established that the Russians had virtually stopped construction of their missile defense system and that the Chinese nuclear missile program had slipped at least a year behind schedule.

Defense Department officials, many of whom had private reservations about the Sentinel system, were brought in to discuss its technical aspects and shortcomings.

Opening Wedge to Nixon

The Senators also consulted with independent scientists opposed to the system, such as Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, formerly science adviser to President Kennedy.

On the basis of the private briefings, the Senators sent memorandums to their colleagues and began to pick up supporters, such as the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, and Senators Robert F. Kennedy, Stuart Symington, George S. McGovern and Charles H. Percy.

If Senator Cooper was the floor leader in the battle, Senator Percy was the behind-the-scenes lobbyist.

When President-elect Nixon flew home from the Rose Bowl

game, Senator Percy managed to get aboard the plane. Before the Senator had proceeded very far in his argument against the Sentinel system, the President-elect was on the intercom, asking the pilot if there was a "secure" telephone circuit that Senator Percy could use to talk with Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, who has been selected as the President's science adviser.

That telephone call provided an opening wedge for the Sentinel opponents into the inner circles of the new Administration.

At the very time that Defense Secretary Laird was announcing a delay in Sentinel deployment, for example, Dr. DuBridge was closeted with Senator Percy and Mr. Miller in the Senator's office. Dr. DuBridge reportedly displayed no detailed knowledge of the Sentinel program, but he said he would study the issue.

When David R. Packard was named Deputy Secretary of Defense, Senator Percy promptly arranged to meet with his former business competitor and personal friend to present his argument. As it turned out, the argument was presented to the very man now responsible for reviewing the Sentinel system.

In Boston today, the formation of a group called the New England Citizens Committee on ABM was announced by Abram Chayeses, of the Harvard Law School. Mr. Chayeses said the opposition group planned to sponsor a national conference on the ABM in Washington during the next three to four weeks.

As the battle proceeded in the Senate, Senator Cooper and his forces lost on the votes but progressively picked up strength in the continuing debate.

Value of Being Informed

Simply because they were better informed, the Cooper forces succeeded in putting on the defensive the Senate Armed Services Committee, which over the years had grown accustomed to not having its judgments and recommendations challenged on the Senate floor.

A turning point in the battle came last Oct. 14 when the Senate, at the suggestion of Senator Cooper, went into secret session to discuss the issue.

Nothing particularly secret was discussed at the session, but for the Sentinel opponents it had two advantages. First, the novelty of a secret session drew a majority of the Senators to the floor to hear for the first time the arguments. Second, it

permitted a candor not normally found in Senate debate.

Under barbed questioning by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Senator Richard B. Russell was forced to acknowledge that the Senate Armed Services Committee had heard only Pentagon witnesses on the Sentinel issue.

That led to an important concession that in the future the committee would hear independent scientists suggested by the Sentinel opponents.

Senator Cooper seized upon the occasion to submit a series of technical questions, which he had prepared with the help of Dr. David R. Inglis of the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, dealing with such issues as whether the Sentinel nuclear warheads would not black out the system's radar.

The Senate Armed Services Committee was placed even more on the defensive, for it became apparent quickly that its members did not understand the questions, much less know the answers.

Even in defeat, however, the Sentinel opposition gained politically. With deployment authorized last fall by Congress, the Army promptly set about selecting Sentinel sites. In the process it began stirring up local opposition in suburban communities on the issue of having nuclear weapons stationed in their backyards.

What had been an abstract, highly technical issue suddenly acquired a direct political interest for many Senators and Representatives.

When opposition began mounting in Hawaii, for example, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, a Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, came out firmly against Sentinel deployment on the ground that it would be "a dangerous step backward" into a nuclear arms race.

His Republican colleague, Hiram L. Fong, began to waver, suggesting the Sentinel bases should be situated on an island other than Oahu.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who had championed the system on the Senate floor, found himself running into political flak back home when the Army proposed to put a Sentinel site at Fort Lawton in the heart of Seattle.

At Senator Jackson's suggestion, the Army agreed to move the site Bainbridge Island, across Puget Sound, but that only served to arouse Representative Thomas M. Pelly, who has a home on the island.

In Reading, Mass., where a Sentinel base was under con-

struction, the Army stirred so much opposition that Senator Edward M. Kennedy openly drawn into the controversy.

At a town meeting in Reading Wednesday night, the Senator found himself running in heckling opposition organized by such former Kennedy administration officials as Wiesner, Richard N. Good and George W. Rathejer.

When the meeting ended an inconclusive, contentious note, the scientists pro were on the phone to Senator imploring him to the fight. Senator Kennedy responded by firing off a letter to Defense Secretary Laird calling upon him to deployment pending a review of the Sentinel system.

In view of the rising opposition. The Cooper are becoming increasingly convinced they can muster a majority in the Senate against Sentinel deployment.

Thanks largely to the ing of Senator Percy, the Sentinel opponents have picked up eight supporters among the 12 new Senators with two others wavering.

There is a growing suspicion among the Sentinel opponents will never be put to a test by the Nixon Administration.

Rather than engage in the Senate, the Administration it is believed, may decide the current review to the Sentinel system to justify defense just of bases, not cities.

If that is the compromise proposed by the Administration, it will be accepted as a victory by the Cooper forces.